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RESISTING SEPARATION: A NEW APPROACH TO
PROTECTING THE UNIQUE RIGHTS OF U.S.
BORN MINOR CHILDREN WHOSE PARENTS
FACE DEPORTATION
I. INTRODUCTION
For Brenda Barrios, 31, who lives in Silver Spring, Md, [Donald]
Trump's election is a "nightmare."She allowed her 10-year-oldAmericanborn son, Frankie, to stay up an hour past his bedtime to watch election
results on Univision.
"When he saw the map go red, and red, and red, and red, he asked
me, 'Mommy, is DonaldTrump going to win?"' she said "Itold him not to
worry." But the next morning, when Frankiewoke up for school, the first
question out of his mouth was: Who won? When Barrios told him it was
Trump, Frankieburst into tears.
"He is afraidhis mom is going to be sent to another country, " she
said. ForBarrios, thatpain is all too real. Her parents immigratedillegally
to the United States when she was 5, leaving her and her sister behind in
Guatemala. When she and her sisterjoined them in 2003, Barriosfinally
felt like she had afamily. But it didn't last. Herfather was deportedin early
2005. Barrios'smom went with him. She hasn't seen them since.
With Trump aspresident, Barriosshares her son'sfear that her own
family will be torn apart. She fears ICE will arrest her husband, who is a
carpenterandplumber, while he is at work. Or that they will comefor her.'
This Note addresses how, in the wake of recent executive and
judicial decisions regarding removal of parents of U.S. citizen children,
advocates for such families should pursue a judicial remedy; the approach
detailed here is designed with the purpose of avoiding the dead end these
families have encountered in the judicial system over the course of decades. 2
' Michael E. Miller, 'I Don't Feel Safe': Undocumented Immigrants Fear What Trump Will
Do as President, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/i-dont-feelsafe-undocumented-immigrants-fear-what-trump-will-do-as-president/2016/11/09/0a2bfc36a6cc-11e6-8042-f4dl11c862dlstory.html (describing some undocumented immigrants' fear of
deportation under President Trump).
2 See infra Part IV.
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Part II of this Note addresses the scale of the issue of minor U.S. citizens
whose parents face removal, recent executive action addressing the issue,
3
and the resulting court actions responding to the executive action. Part III
of this Note outlines the courts' unique approach to the constitutional rights
of minors.' Part IV discusses advocates' prior attempts to block removal on
the basis of constitutional rights violations.' Part V explains the history of
the "best interests of the child" standard and its application in the
immigration context.' Finally, Part VI proposes that advocates should
pursue a judicial remedy, and may find the most success in court by: (1)
focusing on the rights of minor U.S. citizens rather than those of their
parents; (2) arguing that the removal of a parent prior to the child's
attainment of the age of majority impermissibly forces that child to choose
between the unique right of a minor to family unity, and the child's qualified
right to remain, which incorporates consideration of the child's best interests;
and (3) emphasizing the existence of a more narrowly-tailored alternative to
7
immediate removal, with recent executive action serving as a template.
II. MINOR CITIZENS WHOSE PARENTS FACE DEPORTATION
In the half-decade leading up to 2013, about a half million U.S.
citizen children experienced the deportation of one or both parents.' Most
minor children of parents who have been removed stay in the United States,
sometimes in the care of friends or distant family members, or even in foster
care.9 The effects of separation on children include depression and other
mental health issues, problems in school, and financial difficulties."o
As of 2014, there were 4.7 million children under the age of
eighteen, like Frankie, who were born in the United States and lived with at
3 See infra Part II.
4

See infra Part III.

See infra Part IV.
6 See infra Part V.

See infra Part VI.
Emily DeRuy, What Happens To a ChildAfter a Parentis Deported?,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/what-happensto-a-child-after-a-parent-is-deported/432870/ (describing Migration Policy Institute report on
children whose parents were deported). In 2013 alone, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE") removed 72,410 people with one or more U.S.-born children. See Elise Foley, Deportation
Separated Thousands Of United States-Born Children From Parentsin 2013, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 26, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/25/parents-deportation n 5531552.html
(detailing 2013 reports to U.S. Senate on removal of U.S.-citizen children's parents).
9 See Foley, supra note 8 (noting options for children of deported parents who remain in the
United States); see also DeRuy, supra note 8 (describing living situation of children whose parents
are deported).
to See DeRuy, supra note 8 (outlining hardships faced by children of deported parents).
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least one parent who was an undocumented immigrant." Because about
two-thirds of all undocumented immigrants currently residing in the United
States have lived here for at least a decade, many have children who were
born here.12 Their children are citizens, pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which establishes citizenship
for anyone born in the United States." Children of undocumented parents
are not the only young citizens who face the removal of a parent; even legal
permanent residents may be removed for various reasons.1 4 For instance, a
majority of the parents of U.S. citizen children who were removed in 2013
had been convicted of a crime, a removal ground that applies to any noncitizen; the scale of this phenomenon is not surprising given that the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") allows for removal of those who
committed infractions as minor as jumping a turnstile, even if such
infractions occurred decades ago.1 s
While it did not offer relief to all children whose parents faced
removal, the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents ("DAPA") program, created in 2014, could have
provided at least a temporary solution for many of the millions of families
comprised of an undocumented parent and U.S. citizen child.' 6 However,
" See Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Number ofBabies Born to UnauthorizedImmigrants
in US. Continues to Decline, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Oct. 26, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/26/number-of-babies-born-to-unauthorizedimmigrants-in-u-s-continues-to-decline/ (describing demographic research revealing number of
minor citizens with undocumented parents).
12 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Children of Unauthorized Immigrants Represent
Rising Share of K-12 Students, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Nov. 17, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/17/children-of-unauthorized-immigrantsrepresent-rising-share-of-k-12-students/ (correlating increasing percentage of students with
undocumented parents with rising number of long-term undocumented residents).
13 See Passel & Cohn, supra note 11 (explaining origin of birthright citizenship).
14 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2016) (describing numerous
classes of removable non-citizens). Grounds for removal are not limited to undocumented
immigrants, though certain removal grounds arise from being undocumented. Id.
15 See Nancy Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1941-42 (2000) (explaining
immigration consequences of small offenses if severe sentencing is available, even retroactively);
see also Foley, supra note 8 (explaining most parents of U.S.-born children removed for criminal
activity, including less-serious offenses); cf Immigration and Nationality Act § 238, 8 U.S.C. §
1228 (2016) (describing expedited removal process of all non-citizens convicted of aggravated
felonies). The INA definitions of deportable crimes are quite broad; for instance, the term
"aggravated felony" includes offenses that are neither aggravated nor felonies under state laws,
such as certain theft offenses. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(2016). Similarly, the INA defines "conviction" broadly, including not only formal adjudication
of guilt, but also situations where the accused "has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2016).
16 See Rodrigo Ugarte, Immigration: 5.5 Million US Citizen Children Affected by DAPA
3:16
PM),
24,
2015,
POST
(June
Says,
LATIN
Decision,
Report
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this program was placed under injunction while facing legal challenges from
many states, and in June 2016, an evenly divided Supreme Court upheld the
injunction while returning the case to lower courts for trial on the merits."
Then in November of 2016, Donald Trump became President-elect and both
parties to the ongoing proceedings requested a stay until February 20, 2017,
in light of possibility that a new Presidential Administration would end the
program."
Upholding its campaign promises, the Trump administration
rescinded the DAPA program in June 2017, therefore the lawsuit will not
continue.' 9 Furthermore, based on the administration's stated agenda, it
appears less likely that the administration will pursue congressional action
http://www.latinpost.com/articles/61929/20150624/immigration-5-million-citizen-childrenaffected-dapa-decision-report.htm (citing report that claimed DAPA might benefit around 5.5
million U.S-born children). Under DAPA, parents of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents
would be able to "request deferred action (on removal) and employment authorization for three
years ... provided they have lived in the United States continuously since January 1, 2010, and
pass required background checks." See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., EXECUTIVE
ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014-executive-actions-immigration
(last updated Apr. 15, 2015) (explaining DAPA eligibility guidelines). However, those noncitizens who were "enforcement priorities," such as those who had criminal backgrounds, those
deemed national security threats, and those who committed fraud, would have been ineligible for
DAPA; as a result, a portion of those who faced removal would not have been helped by the order.
Id.
17 See Marcia Coyle, Texas Court, After Trump Win, is Asked to Put Immigration Case on
Hold,
NAT'L
L.
J.
(Nov.
18,
2016,
4:53
PM),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202772849853/Texas-Court-After-Trump-Win-IsAsked-to-Put-Immigration-Case-on-Hold?slreturn=20170126155944 (follow "Continue to Lexis
Advance" hyperlink) (describing status of states' challenge to DAPA).
18 See Marcia Coyle, Texas Court, After Trump Win, is Asked to Put Immigration Case on
Hold, NAT'L L. J. (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202772849853/TexasCourt-After-Trump-Win-Is-Asked-to-Put-Immigration-Case-on-Hold?slreturn=20170126155944
(noting mutual decision to stay proceedings).
19 See Marcia Coyle, Texas Court, After Trump Win, is Asked to Put Immigration Case on
Hold, NAT'LL. J. (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202772849853/TexasCourt-After-Trump-Win-Is-Asked-to-Put-Immigration-Case-on-Hold?slreturn=20170126155944
(explaining new administration could end litigation "by withdrawing the guidance that authorized
the deportation delays."). The Department of Homeland Security officially rescinded DAPA on
June 15, 2016. See also Rescission of Memorandum Providingfor DeferredActionfor Parents of
Americans andLawful PermanentResidents ("DAPA'), DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
(June 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providingdeferred-action-parents-americans-and-lawful. This decision addresses President Trump's promise
during his campaign to end President Obama's deferred action programs, which he referred to as
"illegal executive amnesties." Id.; Katie Reilly, Here's What President Trump Has Said About
DACA in the Past, TIME (Sept. 05, 2017), http://time.com/4927100/donald-trump-daca-paststatements/ (documenting candidate's statements regarding DAPA and DACA at August 2016
campaign event); Becki Young, Immigration Predictions Under a Trump Presidency, LAW360
(Nov. 14, 2016, 4:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/862078/immigration-predictionsunder-a-trump-presidency (explaining President Trump's campaign promises regarding
immigration).
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to address the plight of those like the Barrios family, and more likely it will
pursue removal for undocumented immigrants like Frankie's mother.20 As
under past administrations, undocumented immigrants are likely not the only
parents of U.S. citizen children who may face removal; the Trump campaign
pledged to aggressively pursue removal of "criminal aliens," which under
current law includes the large category of those who have committed even
low-level offenses, regardless of whether or not the individual is
undocumented.2 1
III. THE UNIQUE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
Courts have consistently permitted a parent to assert his child's
rights in the context of the parent's removal.22 With the assertion of a child's
right, a unique area of constitutional law provides the framework for legal
arguments. 23 The Supreme Court has made clear that children are protected
20 See Young, supra note 19 (noting Trump campaign's focus on deportations and restrictions,
rather than comprehensive immigration reform through congress). As a candidate, President Trump
emphasized removal of undocumented immigrants, and his discussion of immigration law reform
focused not on creating options for those without status, but on prioritizing U.S. citizens and
keeping immigration levels "within historical norms." See also Los Angeles Times Staff,
Transcript: Donald Trump's Full Immigration Speech, Annotated, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016,9:35
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcriptPM),
20160831-snap-htmlstory.html#annotations:10316347 (outlining candidate's immigration policy
plan).
21 See Morawetz, supra note 15, at 1944-46 (explaining how strict sentencing and "petty
crime" enforcement increases numbers of deportable "criminal aliens"); Los Angeles Times Staff,
Transcript: Donald Trump's Full Immigration Speech, Annotated, L.A. TIMEs (Aug. 31, 2016,9:35
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcriptPM),
20160831-snap-htmlstory.htmil#annotations:10316347 (highlighting candidate's plan to remove
"criminal aliens"). Non-citizens with criminal records were already enforcement priorities under
the Obama administration, so it is unclear whether this policy will change, except in degree, with
the Trump campaign having vowed to bolster Immigration and Customs Enforcement resources.
See id (reporting candidate Trump's vow to "triple the number of ICE agents"); U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 16 (listing those with criminal records as enforcement priorities
for deportations).
22 See Marin-Garcia v. Holder, 647 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining third-party
standing question is addressed prior to, and independent of, merits); Payne-Barahona v. Gonzales,

474 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding standing requirements "easily met" in case of child whose
parent faces removal); cf Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 790 (1977) (hearing appeal of U.S. citizen
fathers denied immigration preference for their illegitimate children); Joanne Joseph, Note, The
Uprootingof the American Dream: The Diminishedand Deferred Rights of the U.S. Citizen Child
in the Immigration Context, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 209, 219 (2014) (noting the "Court
has recognized that potential separation of citizens' family members by immigration policy is a
legally cognizable injury of association.").
23 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (noting "[tihe Court long has recognized that
the status of minors under the law is unique in many respects.").

116

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXIII

by the Constitution, but that their rights "cannot be equated with those of
adults." 24 The Supreme Court based this differentiation on "the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing."2 5 As a result of this special legal status, under some circumstances,
a child has more robust protection under the Constitution than an adult would
receive; in other instances, a child's liberty interests are subordinated to a
parent, or to the state, where an adult's rights would not face similar
subordination.2 6
The Supreme Court acknowledges that because of the differences in
maturity and vulnerability between adults and children, sometimes a child's
rights may be violated under a set of circumstances that would not result in
a violation of the rights of an adult.27 For instance, the Court has held that
both the death penalty, and (in some situations) life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, constitute unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
punishment when imposed upon a juvenile, though not when imposed on an
adult.28 In making such a determination, the Court has declared that it is
critical to take into consideration the marked differences between children
and adults when applying constitutional protections, and that while each
child's case is unique, a categorical approach to juveniles best acknowledges

Id. (listing three reasons why constitutional rights of children are unique).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (differentiating between rights of children and
adults).
26 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67-69 (2010) (holding children's reduced culpability
requires different, in effect greater degree of protection under Eight Amendment); Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (explaining parent's or state's interest in child's welfare may override
child's liberty interest). When a child's liberty interests are at stake, her rights are usually
equivalent to those of an adult, however, "the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account
for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, . . .sympathy, and .. .paternal attention."'
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (alteration in original) (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
550 (1971) (plurality opinion)) (explaining reason for differing treatment of children's liberty
interests in some cases).
27 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68-69 (explaining why juvenile offender has diminished moral
culpability). The Court in Graham noted that a juvenile's "lack of maturity," increased
susceptibility to "outside pressures," and greater ability to change, "when compared to an adult
murderer," meant that "a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished
moral culpability." Id.
28 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (holding sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offender violates Eighth Amendment). The Court noted that it was drawing "[t]his clear
line ... to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile ...
offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment." Id.; Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding those who commit crimes while under age eighteen ineligible for
death penalty). Similar to the Court in Graham, the Court in Roper noted that "is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood." Id.
24
25
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inherent differences from adults and reduces the risk of erroneous
decisions.29
The flip side of categorically greater protections for juveniles under
the Constitution is that the Supreme Court has been willing to subordinate a
minor child's liberty interests to those of a parent, or to the state itself, under
certain circumstances.3 0 The reasoning behind such subordination is the
broader social and legal context in which minors, "by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed
to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the
State must play its part as parenspatriae."3 1 The subordination of a child's
individual rights to parental decision-making rights has been broadly and
repeatedly affirmed by the courts, with the notable exception of the decision
to acquire an abortion.32 In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court held that a
child's decision to acquire an abortion could not be subordinated to parental
decision-making because of the "grave and indelible" nature of the
decision.3 3
Overall, the Supreme Court has been less willing to subordinate a
child's liberty interests to state interests than to parental rights, largely
confining such subordination to instances where children are unable due to
their age to make choices that are in their own best interests, or where they
are otherwise uniquely vulnerable.34 For instance, in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court
held that government interests in preventing a disturbance in a school setting
did not outweigh the right of children to express their views in school, even
anti-war views.3 5 This is in contrast to Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), where the Court permitted a restriction on the sale of sexually themed
29 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 77-79 (holding categorical approach is best for dealing with issues
ofjuveniles and Eighth Amendment).
'o See Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 (explaining juvenile liberty interests may be subordinated
because minors, "are always in some form of custody").
31 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 at 265 (1984) (alteration in original) (describing unique lack

of liberty inherent to childhood).
32 See Alison M. Osterberg, Note and Comment, Removing the Dead Hand on the Future:
Recognizing Citizen Children'sRights Against ParentalDeportation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
751, 768 (2009) (describing courts' deference to parental rights, based on ability to act in child's

best interest).
33 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (noting abortion one of "few" situations where

denial of decision-making right has far-reaching consequences).
34 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979) (describing precedent that State may limit
children's choices where children are unable to protect themselves); cf Osterberg, supra note 32,
at 768 ("[W]hen the rights of children primarily conflict with government objectives, the Supreme
Court has been more willing to recognize the [children's] independent substantive rights.").
3 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (rejecting government's argument for prohibition on students
wearing anti-war armbands at school).
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magazines to a child, though such a sale would be protected by the First
Amendment in the case of an adult.36 The Court reasoned that the sale of
such magazines is a danger to children, and that the state has the right to
intervene in order to protect children from this danger because they lack the
maturity necessary to protect themselves. 3 7
International custody disputes present another context in which state
interests may be weighed against the rights of a minor U.S. citizen, a context
complicated by the fact that these cases also involve the rights of parents."
In such cases, any citizenship-based right a child has to remain in the United
States has been wholly subordinated by courts to the combined interests of
parents and the state.39 The courts have determined that when a parent seeks
to live outside the United States with her minor child, that parent's right to
care, custody, and control of her child takes precedence.4 0 Also choosing to
prioritize the state's interest in such cases, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the compelling reasons why countries developed international
treaties related to custody, in particular the state's interest in promoting the
welfare of children in the face of possible international abduction by a
parent. 41 The Court noted that the separation from home and parent forced
by such an abduction may cause children to endure loss of community, loss
of stability, psychological problems, and loss of a support system.4 2 In the
36 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634-35 (conceding adults have First Amendment right to purchase
magazines prohibited for purchase by children).
3 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (justifying infringement ofjuvenile's right based on state's
interest in protecting child).
3 See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 5, 15 (2010) (describing interests of parent in custody
decisions, and interest of Executive Branch in interpreting treaty); Sinchez-Londofio v. Gonzalez,
752 F.3d 533, 537, 540 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing limited parental choice regarding child
residence, regardless of child's citizenship, if parents disagree).
39 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20 (failing to consider a citizen child's right to remain when handling
international custody dispute). In Abbott, the Court noted that an international treaty orders a child
to return to the country the child had lived in, if that child is abducted by a parent, but that the treaty
"does not alter the existing allocation of custody rights," instead allowing "the courts of the home
country to decide what is in the child's best interests." Id.; see also Darin v. Olivero-Huffman, 746
F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing overriding force of state interest in preventing international
child abductions); Sdnchez-Londoho, 752 F.3d at 540 (explaining children are unable to decide
where to live, so parents have decision-making right).

4 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 6, 11, 15 (deciding father's right of custody included right to have
U.S. citizen son returned to Chile); see also Darin, 746 F.3d at 5, 14 (finding mother wrongfully
retained son, who had dual citizenship, in United States against father's will).
41 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20-21 (explaining interest of state in promoting child's best interest
by preventing abduction); Darin, 746 F.3d at 7-8 (describing purpose of treaty as preventing
abduction induced by lure of forum shopping).
42 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20-21 (listing abduction harms). The Court, in describing the state's
interest in preventing child abduction, has detailed a list of harms that an abducted child may suffer
from being separated from a parent, including: trauma from lack of support systems, depression,
stress, post-traumatic stress disorder, and impairment of ability to mature and form identity. Id
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unique context of international custody disputes, therefore, it appears that a
child's rights may be trumped either by a parent's wishes, or by the state's
interest in promoting the child's welfare by preventing separation from a
parent and community.43
IV. JUDICIAL HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK REMOVAL OF
PARENTS
Non-citizens in deportation proceedings generally have few, if any,
options available for relief if they fail to show that they are not subject to
removal." In some instances, a person facing removal may apply for a
waiver. 45 However, such a waiver is only available in a limited number of
cases, and where it is a possibility, the standard of "extreme hardship" makes
it very difficult to qualify for relief; additionally, those who seemingly meet
the standard are still faced with the reality that the waiver is subject to
Furthermore, some non-citizens are subject to
judicial discretion.4 6
mandatory removal without the possibility of applying for a waiver. 47 Those
denied a waiver, or those who are unable to apply either because they do not
meet qualifications or because they are subject to mandatory removal, may
nonetheless appeal a removal order based on violation of constitutional
rights.

48

The backdrop to every constitutional challenge in removal
proceedings is the plenary powers doctrine. 49 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly made clear that, due to national sovereignty issues, Congress's
Additionally, there are harms the child may suffer specifically from "loss of community and
stability," including: "loneliness, anger, and fear of abandonment." Id.
43 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20-21 (acknowledging state's right to override one parent's decision
regarding child's residence, to prevent abduction harms); Sdnchez-Londoiio, 752 F.3d at 540
(explaining parents, not child, have right to determine child's place of residence).
4 See Morawetz, supra note 15, at 1940-43 (describing mandatory deportation category
barring relief, and hurdle detention may cause those eligible for relief).
45 See Grace Kaskade, Note, Mothers Without Borders: Undocumented Immigrant Mothers
Facing Deportation and the Best Interests of their U.S. Citizen Children, 15 WM. & MARY J.
WoMEN & L. 447, 460 (2009) (describing INA's extreme hardship waiver provision for certain
non-citizens facing removal).
46 See Kaskade, supra note 45, at 460, 464 (describing high bar for proving removal would
result in extreme hardship to qualifying family members).
47 See Morawetz, supra note 15, at 1948 (explaining mandatory removal category).
48 See Hernandez-Lara v. Holder, 563 F. App'x 401, 403 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding court's
jurisdiction over constitutional claims in removal proceedings); cf Martial-Emanuel v. Holder, 523

F. App'x 345, 348-49 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining limited power of judicial review in removal
proceedings). "Although Congress has largely removed from our oversight the government's
exercise of discretion in this area, we do have jurisdiction to review 'constitutional claims for
questions of law raised upon a petition to review."' Id. at 349 (quoting 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(D)).
49 See Joseph, supra note 22, at 213 (explaining plenary powers doctrine).
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power over immigration-related decisions is rarely subject to a high standard
of judicial review."o This rule, which is strongest in the context of
admissions to the U.S., does have exceptions, but in general the doctrine
presents a significant hurdle for those advocating on behalf of immigrants
and their families.s' The doctrine sets forth a standard of judicial review for
immigration-related matters that is so minimal, it is arguably less thorough
than rational basis review.52 Even in immigration cases where a U.S.
citizen's fundamental constitutional rights appear to be at stake, courts have
tended to defer to Congress.
In the context of a minor U.S. citizen's parent's removal, many
advocates have focused on the fundamental rights of the child citizen, rather
than any rights of the non-citizen parent, when making an argument in
court.5 4 The aim is seemingly to attempt to subject the cases to strict
scrutiny, requiring the government interest at stake to be substantial, and the
means of achieving such a purpose to be as narrowly tailored as possible.
These attempts at relief have largely relied on two substantive due
process theories: removal violates either a fundamental right to remain in the
United States, or a fundamental right to family unity.56 Both theories have
'0 See id (detailing basis of plenary powers in concept of sovereignty).
" See Joanne Joseph, Note, The Uprooting of the American Dream: The Diminished and
Deferred Rights of the US. Citizen Child in the Immigration Context, 24 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 209, 214, 219 (2014) (noting modem trend for courts to limit plenary powers, but that scope
of limitation is unclear). The strength of the plenary powers doctrine does appear to be strongest
in relation to issues of admission into the United States. Id.
52 See id. at 213 (outlining low standard of review).
53 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977) (emphasizing plenary powers in case where
U.S. citizen fathers' illegitimate children were denied immigration preference); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (relying on "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" to bar
author's admission when U.S. citizens claimed First Amendment violation); Hernandez-Rivera v.
INS, 630 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1980) (agreeing child of deported parents face de facto
deportation, but still deferring to Congress); Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969)
(noting "rational distinction" in barring minor from petitioning for parent, despite age
discrimination argument).
54 See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara v. Holder, 563 F. App'x 401, 403 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting
numerous cases dealing with rights asserted by U.S. citizen children of people facing removal);
Martial-Emanuel v. Holder, 523 F. App'x 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing numerous cases
dealing with rights asserted by U.S. citizen families of people facing removal); Marin-Garcia v.
Holder, 647 F.3d 666, 672-74 (7th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging frequency of petitioner's approach
of asserting rights of citizen child).
5s See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964) (outlining strict scrutiny standard
for fundamental rights); Marin-Garcia,647 F.3d at 672-73 (inferring petitioner sought "a more
stringent standard should apply" in asserting child's rights).
56 See Osterberg,supra note 32, at 759 (describing basis for assertion of rights of U.S. citizen
children in context of parental removal). Other unsuccessful theories have included the claim that
removal is a form of punishment and therefore subject to the Eight Amendment, and that the
"extreme hardship" standard for removal waivers constitutes an Equal Protection violation, since it
is not the standard applied to children of non-immigrants. See Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 264

2017-18]

RESISTING SEPARATION

121

met such consistent rejection over the years that some courts now barely even
address the issues, instead determining that the substantive due process rights
of neither children, nor parents, are ever infringed in the case of ordinary
removal proceedings, and describing the issue as well-settled.5 7
A. Right to Remain
The right to remain argument is based on the principle that a U.S.
citizen may not be deported." Because the right of a U.S. citizen against
deportation has been firmly established as a fundamental constitutional
guarantee, advocates have attempted to argue that removal of a parent also
effectively removes a U.S. citizen minor child, since the child is dependent
on that parent.59 Courts have generally rejected this argument in one of three
ways.60 One line of reasoning is that a minor is unable to exercise a
constitutional right to remain, because he is subject to the decisions of his
guardians on the matter due to his age, and therefore the right simply does
not exist during a child's minority." Another line of reasoning is that
because a child compelled to leave the United States with a parent may freely
choose to return at a different date, namely after reaching the age of majority,
her departure is not a true removal in the first place.62 Similarly, some courts
reason that a child in such circumstances has not faced actual removal since
(1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting claim that removal is punishment and subject to Eighth Amendment
restrictions); Hernandez-Lara, 563 F. App'x at 403 (rejecting claim that waiver standard
unconstitutional because it only applies to children of non-citizens).
57 See, e.g., Payne-Barahona v. Gonzdles, 474 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The circuits that have
addressed the constitutional issue ... have uniformly held that a parent's otherwise valid
deportation does not violate a child's constitutional right."); Hernandez-Lara,563 F. App'x at 403
("[T]he law on this point is settled: a United States-citizen child's constitutional rights are not
implicated by the government's otherwise valid decision to deport that child's parents."); MarinGarcia, 647 F.3d at 674 ("[S]everal other circuits have ruled that the removal of an illegal alien
does not work a constitutional violation on the alien's citizen-children.").
58 See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (establishing deportation of citizen as
violation of liberty interest).
59 See Amanda Colvin, Comment, Birthright Citizenship in the United States: Realities ofDe
FactoDeportationand InternationalComparisonsToward Proposinga Solution, 53 ST. Louis L.
J. 219, 220-21 (2008) (describing phenomenon of de facto deportation).
60 See infra notes 61-63 (explaining courts' reasoning in rejecting claims of citizen children).
61 See Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444, 445-46 (6th Cir. 1981) (reasoning right to remain is
theoretical until person can consciously choose domicile); Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181
(5th Cir. 1969) (explaining "minor children do not ordinarily determine where their own home will
be").
62 See Ayala-Flores, 662 F.2d at 446 (noting U.S. citizen child free to choose United States as
residence upon becoming an adult); Alison M. Osterberg, Note and Comment, Removing the Dead
Hand on the Future: Recognizing Citizen Children's Rights Against ParentalDeportation, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 751, 761 (2009) (describing Third Circuit case that reasoned children are
delayed in exercising right to remain).
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she is free to remain in the United States even during her age of minority,
albeit without her parent(s), and that what is really at issue is her ability to
confer this right onto her parent(s), which she may not do.63
The backdrop to these decisions, however, is that advocates either
essentially positioned one constitutional right (the right to remain) in
opposition to the plenary powers of Congress, or advocated for the general
inadvisability of separating families; they did not directly argue that a child
was forced to choose between a right to remain and another protected
fundamental constitutional right.64 The failure to achieve this positioning
may have been decisive.65 It is a long-standing principle of constitutional
law that the government may not force a person to choose between two
fundamental rights.66
B. Right to Family Unity
The recurring argument that the Constitution encompasses a
fundamental right to family unity has its roots in the courts' long history of
protecting "the family unit from unwarranted intrusions by the state," and
the "interests of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children." 6 7
In cases involving removal of the parent of a U.S. citizen child, courts have
regularly rejected the argument that removal violates a fundamental right to
unity for a few reasons.68 Some courts have rejected the contention that such
a right exists, noting the disparate factual scenarios giving rise to the relevant
case law.6 9 Other courts, although appearing to find less fault with
arguments supporting the existence of a fundamental right to family unity,
have been hesitant to give such a right legal force; their hesitation is due to
the prospect of children relying on the right to prevent separation in
63 See Perdido, 420 F.2d at 1181 (holding child has right to remain but cannot "confer
immigration benefits on his parents"); Amanda Colvin, Comment, Birthright Citizenship in the
United States: Realities of De Facto Deportation and International Comparisons Toward
Proposinga Solution, 53 ST. Louis L. J. 219, 220 (2008) (citing case where court noted right to
remain "is personal and cannot be imputed to non-citizens").
6 See sources cited supra notes 61- 63.
65 See Osterberg, supra note 32, at 764-65 (noting series of dissents in Ninth Circuit removal
cases focused on impermissible choice between rights).
66 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (holding government could not
effectively force choice between right to travel and free association).
67 See Joseph, supra note 22, at 227 (quoting Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp
1179, 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1997) and Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)) (citing history of
common law protecting family unit).
68 See Joseph, supra note 22 at 228 (noting pattern of defeat for claim of right to family unity
in removal cases).
69 See Payne-Barahona,474 F.3d at 3 (noting diversity in cases creates difficulty in fitting
them into a pattern).
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circumstances such as parental incarceration or subjection to the military
draft.70
In non-immigration contexts, courts have been more willing to
acknowledge the existence of some sort of right to family unity. In cases
involving removal, courts have been reluctant to acknowledge its existence,
and even where courts indicate there may be a right to family unity, they
have not relied on its existence to halt removal.72 Some courts have reasoned
that the right to family unity is not abridged in the case of a parent's removal
because the right is narrowly enforceable by the court system, and in removal
cases it is not enforceable at all since the family separation may be
temporary.
In other instances in the immigration context, courts simply
refused to use strict scrutiny when considering violation of a right to family
unity; instead, they relied on the plenary powers doctrine in order to use a
lenient standard of review, ultimately deferring to Congress's power to
exclude non-citizens. 74 However, like the removal cases that relied on a
child's right to remain in the United States, those cases relying on a right to
family unity have generally not explicitly argued that a citizen was forced
into an impermissible choice between two fundamental rights.
V. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD STANDARD AND ITS
APPLICATION IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
The "best interests of the child" standard has a long history in the
United States.76 It is a standard often used in custody proceedings between
two parents, and also during proceedings terminating parental custody or

70 See Payne-Barahona,474 F.3d at 3 (fearing right to family unity might be asserted by child
in other contexts).
71 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at
651) (noting fundamental liberty interest for parent to have "companionship, care, custody, and
management" of children in case involving termination of parental rights); Joseph, supra note 22,
at 230 (describing D.C. Circuit case finding "rights of parent and child to one another's
companionship").
72 See infra notes 73-74.
7 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft Div. of the Dept' of Homeland Sec., 510
F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (deciding family integrity right not recognized in removal context since
it is only temporary).
74 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794-95 (1977) (deciding issue of family unity does not
necessitate a more "exacting standard" of review); Martial-Emanuel v. Holder, 523 F. App'x 345,
350 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding right to "live ... with family as one chooses" outweighed by Congress'
immigration authority).
7 See sources cited supranotes 73-74.
76 See Kaskade, supra note 45, at 457 (explaining best interests standard is a "guiding star,"
incorporated into legal codes in many jurisdictions).
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rights overall. 77 It has also been used to justify a government interest
outweighing a child's rights, where the government interest itself is
preservation of the child's best interest." There are limitations upon the
application of the standard; the state cannot give preference to its own
79
determination of a child's best interest over that of a fit parent.
In the immigration context, advocates have argued that the best
interests of the child standard should be applied in court proceedings
surrounding removal waivers, when a parent may be separated from a child
who is a U.S. citizen." Petitioners have gained courts' acknowledgement
that "any separation of a child from its [parent] is a hardship," and therefore
not in the child's best interest." However, in the face of a removal that
would clearly not be in the child's best interest, courts have nonetheless
consistently applied the "extreme hardship" standard, and have determined
that because it is a more stringent standard, it requires suffering beyond that
which is inherent to any separation caused by removal.82
Courts have held that it is permissible for Congress to require the
extreme hardship standard for waivers, rather than the best interest standard,
reasoning that Congress has a rational basis for such a decision because it
might otherwise not be able to remove anyone with a child who is a U.S.
citizen.83 However, a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Cabrera-Alvarez v.
n See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000) (noting there is presumption that fit parent
will act in child's best interest); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) (calling the standard
"proper and feasible criterion" for awarding custody to one parent over another). The Court has
ruled that the state may only intervene on a child's behalf, over the wishes of parents, if the parents
are unfit and consequently, there is no presumption that they will act in the child's best interest. Id.
78 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (holding where children unable to "recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them," state intervention appropriate).
7 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (finding violation of parental right to make child-rearing
decisions where state imposes view that "'better' decision could be made").
so See Kaskade, supra note 76, at 460 (describing best interest standard in context of extreme
hardship waiver).
81 See Hernandez-Lara v. Holder, 563 F. App'x 401, 402-03 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting emotional
hardship inherent in any separation of parent and child during removal proceedings); see also
Amanda Colvin, Comment, Birthright Citizenship in the United States: Realities of De Facto
DeportationandInternationalComparisons TowardProposinga Solution, 53 ST. Louis L.J. 219,
220 (2008) (quoting Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 2003)).
82 See Hernandez-Lara,563 F. App'x at 402-03; Marin-Garcia v. Holder, 647 F.3d 666, 67374 (7th Cir. 2011) (upholding congressional authority to make exacting hardship standard, despite
threat to "integrity of the family unit"); Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzdles, 423 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th
Cir. 2005) (explaining and upholding extreme hardship standard).
83 See Hernandez-Lara,563 F. App'x at 403 (rejecting categorization of parental deportation
as unusual hardship on child). The court in Hernandez-Larawas concerned that a contrary ruling
would "create a substantial loophole in the immigration laws, allowing all deportable aliens to
remain in this country if they bear children here." Id (quoting Newton v. INS., 736 F.2d 336, 343
(6th Cir. 1984)). Similarly, the court in Marin-Garciareasoned that the entire point of extreme
hardship standard is to prevent the "perverse incentive" to "avoid the consequences of unlawful
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Gonzdles, opened up the possibility that the best interests of the child may
be considered as a factor within the extreme hardship standard, and that the
more exacting standard does not mean that a child's best interest is not
relevant at all.84 Whether the Ninth Circuit's interpretation will become the
majority view remains to be seen; regardless, it only applies to those cases
where a non-citizen is able to apply for discretionary relief, not in mandatory
removal cases."s
The other immigration context where the best interests of the child
standard has been discussed in court is pre-removal juvenile detention
hearings.86 In Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court considered whether there
was a requirement for a child's best interests to prevail in making pre-hearing
custody arrangements. The Court held that in a case where the government
was exercising its custodial responsibility, there was no requirement for a
child's best interest to prevail among other interests." The Court explained
that a child in such circumstances has a fundamental right to a minimum
standard of care, but that anything beyond that involves a balancing of
factors, and the state has no obligation to choose the very best option." But
while the Court determined that there was no substantive due process right
for a child's best interests to prevail, it did not fully address whether there
entry into the United States by having a child." Marin-Garcia, 647 F.3d at 674 (rejecting
categorization of parental deportation as unusual hardship on child); see also Cabrera-Alvarez,423
F.3d at 1013 ("[N]o rule of statutory construction required the agency to elevate the qualifying
child's best interests to a level that would effectively eliminate or alter the express comparative
standard set forth in the statutory text.").
84 See Cabrera-Alvarez, 423 F.2d at 1012 (reasoning "'best interests' are merely the converse
of 'hardship').
85 See id. at 1012 (explaining standard applies if parent able to seek cancellation of removal);
Nancy Morawetz, Symposium: Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 DeportationLaws and the
Limited Scope ofProposedReforms, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1936, 1940-43 (2000) (explaining relief
not available to all in mandatory removal proceedings).
86 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-05 (1993) (addressing respondents' argument for use
of best interest standard for pre-removal juvenile detention).
87 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 303-05 (addressing arguments regarding pre-removal detention
arrangements). At question in Floreswas whether juveniles facing pre-removal detention have the
"right to an individualized hearing on whether private placement would be in the child's 'best
interests'-followed by private placement if the answer is in the affirmative." Id at 303.
88 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 304 ("'The best interests of the child' is ... not an absolute and
exclusive constitutional criterion for the government's exercise of . .. custodial responsibilities.").
The Court noted that while the "best interests of the child" standard is often used as a criterion for
official decision-making, "it is not traditionally the sole criterion-much less the sole constitutional
criterion-for ... judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in varying degrees
with the interests of others." Id.
89 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 304 (noting other situations where state was under obligation to meet
baseline needs only). Where the state is required to provide for a child's schooling, healthcare, or
housing, it is not required to provide the best option available for meeting those needs. Id. In these
instances, the decision to surpass these requirements is not mandated by constitutional
requirements. Id.
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might be a proceduraldue process requirement to consider the child's best
interest as a factor, and also left open the possibility that its holding might
be different for U.S. citizen children. 90
VI. ANALYSIS
When the parent of a child who is a U.S. citizen is deported, the child
is invariably injured-either by having to leave his life and community in
the United States, or by losing a parent or both parents; both alternatives will
lead to that child suffering emotionally, developmentally, financially, and
otherwise. 9' Advocates have attempted to seek a judicial remedy for these
children and their families, but have thus far resoundingly failed to achieve
success. 9 2 Recently, the executive branch's attempt to at least partially
address the issue through DAPA was blocked in court.93 Based on its
campaign promises to ramp up immigration enforcement, and its quick
repeal of DAPA, it seems unlikely that an executive remedy or an attempt to
encourage immigration reform through the legislative process will be
forthcoming during the Trump administration. 94 Regardless of what the
Trump administration chooses to do going forward, DAPA's history of
challenges in the court system, and the subsequent threat of shifts in policy
based on new executive priorities, illustrates the perils of relying on
executive action to address immigration related issues." Given DAPA's
inability to address the problem of separation of U.S citizen minors and their
deported parents due to legal challenges, occurring at the same time that a
new administration has threatened increased removals, it may be prudent for
90 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-04 (outlining and rejecting substantive due process claim that
child's best interest should prevail); cf id. at 305-06 ("[I]f we harbored any doubts as to the
constitutionality of institutional custody over unaccompanied juveniles, they would surely be
eliminated as to those juveniles .. . who are aliens."). The Court did emphasize that Congress has
authority to pass laws regarding non-citizens that are unacceptable when applied to citizens. The
Court in Flores also rejected a procedural due process claim, but its reasoning focused on, and
subsequently rejected, the argument that each juvenile should have an individualized hearing
regarding his best interests, and that his best interests should prevail. See id at 308 (describing
procedural claim as reframing of substantive claim). The Court also determined that the state was,
in fact, focusing on the child's needs, describing the conflict as one between a child's "interest in
being released into the custody of strangers" versus the state's interest in "protecting the welfare of
the juveniles who have come into the Government's custody." Id. at 305.
91 See sources cited supra notes 10-11 (describing damage done to children of deported
parents).
92 See cases cited supranote 54 (setting forth history of failed challenges of parent's removal).
9 See sources cited supra notes 17-18 (tracing DAPA court history).
94 See sources cited supra notes 19-21 (describing current administration's campaign
promises).
95 See sources cited supranotes 17-21 (explaining DAPA injunction, stay of court proceedings,
shift in administration immigration policies).

2017-18]

RESISTING SEPARATION

127

advocates to fully pursue judicial remedies for the affected families, despite
past failures in court.96
A challenge to the deportation of the parents of minor U.S. citizens
should first and foremost focus on the rights of the child rather than the
parents, to increase chances of success in court.97 The Court has made
abundantly clear that Congress has a strong interest in maintaining national
sovereignty by enforcing immigration laws. 9 8 Advocates hoping to
challenge the removal of a non-citizen will do best if their cases are reviewed
under a strict scrutiny standard, as government interests are likely to
outweigh individual rights under a lower standard of scrutiny in most cases. 99
However, courts have been reluctant to use strict scrutiny when reviewing
cases of non-citizens in removal proceedings. "' While these individuals are
certainly "persons," and therefore might expect to have their fundamental
constitutional rights upheld, courts regularly treat removal proceedings as
interchangeable with initial exclusion from entry.1 01 As a result, courts
generally review the rights of non-citizens in removal under a less rigorous
standard, relying on the plenary powers doctrine.1 02 Accordingly, to increase
chances of strict scrutiny review, advocates should focus their arguments on
the rights of U.S. citizen children.103
Those who have attempted to pursue relief from removal by basing
their challenges on the rights of U.S. citizen children have still been defeated
in court again and again over the decades, therefore those hoping to succeed
in the face of this bleak precedent would do best with a multi-faceted
approach." First, it may be critical to argue that a parent's removal forces
the minor child into an unconstitutional choice between two fundamental
96 See sources cited supra note 12 (describing increase in U.S.-born children of undocumented

parents due to large percentage of long-term residents); see also sources cited supra notes 17-19
(reiterating Trump campaign's promise regarding new emphasis on removal).
97 See case cited supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting Court's willingness to consider
right for citizen children that it rejected for non-citizen children).
98 See Joseph, supra note 22, at 214, 219 (explaining plenary powers doctrine); see also
sources cited supra note 53 (illustrating Court's use of doctrine to defer to other branches of
government on immigration issues).
9 See sources cited supra note 55 (explaining strict scrutiny standard of review).
100 See sources cited supra note 54 (describing historic difficulty of challenging parent's
removal).
101 See sources cited supra note 63 (reasoning failure to deport parent due to citizen child's
presence impermissibly grants right to remain).
102 See sources cited supra note 74 (deciding plenary powers doctrine controls standard of
review).
103 See case cited supra note 90 (clarifying review of rights includes critical factor of whether
children hold citizenship).
'04 See sources cited supra note 54 (explaining precedent reflects difficulty in arguing parental
removal based on children's citizenship).
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rights, rather claiming only one fundamental right is at stake."os Second, in
order to establish the existence of a choice between fundamental rights, it
may be necessary to establish that a minor child has a fundamental right to
family unity during her age of minority even if her parent does not have a
reciprocal right to family unity, and that a minor citizen has at least a
qualified right to remain in the United States that incorporates consideration
of her best interests. 106 Finally, it may help to use DAPA as an example of
a more narrowly tailored alternative to immediate removal that preserves the
minor child's right while upholding the state's interest in enforcing
immigration laws. 0 7
A. An Impermissible Choice Between FundamentalRights
To succeed where other advocates have failed at persuading courts
that a minor child's fundamental rights are violated when a parent is
removed, it may be necessary to argue that the child has been
unconstitutionally forced to choose between rights."0 s Advocates have had
some success arguing that a child's fundamental right is at stake when a
family faces division in the immigration context.1 09 For instance, some
courts have conceded that minor citizens retain the right to remain in the
United States.11 0 Yet these same courts held that the right was not violated
in the context of a parent's removal, as the child was technically free to
remain in the United States."1 ' In the absence of an unconstitutionally
coerced choice between the right to remain and another right, therefore, a
constructive deportation argument against the removal of a child's parent is
likely to fail." 2
The relative weakness of an argument focused on only one
fundamental right violation, or even multiple rights that are not set up in the
context of a coerced choice, has played out again and again in the history of

See analysis infra Section 0.
106 See analysis infra Section 0.
107 See analysis infra Section 0.
'0 See case cited supra note 66 (explaining principle that government may not force people to
choose between fundamental rights).
109 See sources cited supra notes 62-63 (acknowledging citizen children have right to choose
to remain).
110 See sources cited supra notes 62-63 (noting children, like all citizens, have right to be free
from deportation).
"' See sources cited supra note 63 (determining child's ability to transfer right to parent
distinct from child's right to remain).
112 See case cited supra note 66 (explaining principle that government may not force people to
choose between fundamental rights).
105
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immigration cases, beyond just cases where a parent faces removal.113 In
Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court held that the government's interest in
excluding individuals for a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason"
outweighed the First Amendment rights of U. S. citizens who wanted to hear
those individuals speak.114 In Fiallo v. Bell, another critical Supreme Court
decision, the Court again deferred to Congress's powers to determine who to
exclude, when those powers were weighed against both sex-based
discrimination and citizens' interests in family unity.11 s
The history of failed constitutional challenges to immigration laws
illustrates two reasons why advocates might see more success if alleging a
forced choice to preserve one fundamental right at the expense of another. 1 16
The first reason is that the existence of impermissible coercion, in addition
to the potential violation of any given fundamental right, might tilt the scales
against government interest in a way that a simple balancing of liberty
interests against plenary power has not."' The second reason is that the
assertion of such an impermissible choice could preclude the government
from arguing that there is no violation of rights in the case at hand, given the
Where advocates have been
option of another permissible choice."
successful in persuading courts that a right to family unity, or a right to
remain, is at stake when a citizen child's parent faces removal, they have still
ultimately lost due to the government's argument either that such rights were
not violated, because the child could remain (and be separated from family),
or that the violation of the right was outweighed by government interests.1 19
Those lines of argument should be countered by establishing the presence of
an impermissible choice between rights.120

See cases cited supra note 53 (detailing cases where government has prevailed absent
argument of coerced choice between rights).
114 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (describing the balancing between
113

the interests and weighing of government interests).
'15 See sources cited supra notes 53-54 (articulating Fiallov. Bell case).
116 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (reviewing policy that people
should not be forced to choose between fundamental rights); see also supra note 65 (noting
dissenting opinions focused on impermissible choice between rights); cases cited supra notes 63,
73-74 (describing failure of arguments focused on only one asserted right).
117 See supra note 65 (reviewing a required impermissible choice between rights might assist
argument prevailing); see also sources cited supra notes 63, 73-74 (highlighting arguments
focusing on one asserted right is often weak).
I' See sources cited supranotes 65-66 (reflecting prohibition on forcing individuals to choose
between fundamental rights).
"' See sources cited supra notes 63, 73-74 (noting arguments likely to fail when focused on
only one asserted right).
120 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (noting strength in arguing there
is a choice between rights conflicting).
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B. Minor Children's Unique Right to Family Unity, andRight to Remain in
the United States
However, to successfully claim that a minor U.S. citizen, whose
parent faces removal proceedings, has been impermissibly forced to choose
between fundamental rights, it may first be necessary to establish unique
boundaries of a child's rights in the immigration context.1 2 1 In particular, it
may be necessary to argue that (1) a minor child has a right to family unity
even where her parent may not have a reciprocal right, and (2) a minor citizen
has an immediate right to remain in the United States, that she is able to
independently exercise when her parent's decisions regarding her residency
have been coerced by the state without consideration of the child's best
interests. 12 2
i. A Minor's Unique Right to Family Unity
One premise at the core of attempts to prevent removal of the parents
of minor U.S. citizens is that separation of the family is ultimately
detrimental to the child, and advocates can point to a wealth of supporting
evidence. 123 It seems certain that courts support this premise; in rulings on
custody and parental termination, courts have firmly established that in the
eyes of the law, children are best served by remaining with their parents in
anything but drastic situations.1 24 But in the framework of a challenge to a
parent's removal that claims an unconstitutionally coerced choice between
rights, it may be necessary to establish afundamentalright to family unity.125
This need is both practical, in that there are a limited number of rights that
advocates could realistically assert are violated in such cases, and logical, as
advocates regularly rely on arguments about the value of family integrity in
such cases even where they assert no fundamental right, given the facial
relevance of the issue.126

121 See analysis infra Sections 0-0.
122 See analysis infra Sections 0-0.
123 See sources cited supranotes 68-70 (claiming right to family unity in immigration context);
see also case cited supra note 42 (describing studies detailing harms of separating child from
parent).
124 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (highlighting importance of maintaining
family unity); see also sources cited supra notes 67, 71, 81 (establishing court's interest in
preserving family integrity, removing children only if parent unfit).
125 See sources cited supra notes 67-71 (illustrating diversity of court opinions regarding
existence of fundamental right to family unity).
126 See Amanda Colvin, Comment, BirthrightCitizenship in the UnitedStates: Realities ofDe
Facto DeportationandInternationalComparisons Toward Proposinga Solution, 53 ST. Louis U.
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To successfully establish existence of a fundamental right to family
unity, advocates will likely need to limit the scope of such a right to a
significant extent, and to rely on our judicial system's unique approach to
the rights of children. 127 Courts are generally reluctant to find "new"
fundamental rights; while some courts looked at the long history of case law
protecting a parent's custody, care, companionship, and control of his child
and determined that a right to family unity may already exist, they either
chose not to give such a right legal teeth for fear of the ramifications, or
determined that it is only enforceable in extremely limited circumstances. 128
Where courts have acknowledged a right to family unity, they have tended
to limit the scope of its applications to cases where a threatened separation
would be permanent, rather than temporary, addressing concerns that such a
right would complicate issues such as incarceration or the military draft. 129
Given this judicial history, while there is precedent for the assertion of a right
to family unity, the assertion of that right might be more successful if narrow
in scope, as it would address the serious concerns courts have about its broad
application. 130
Furthermore, many courts have conflated the concept of a right to
family unity with broader parental rights."' In the context of the removal of
a parent, this parental rights lens has meant that any violation of the parent's
rights has been subject to a lower level of scrutiny, and the government's
ultimate court victory, due to the plenary powers doctrine. 13 2 As a result,
when narrowly defining a right to family unity, advocates would be wise to
focus on the right as one independently held by the minor child, to increase

L. J. 219, 220-21 (2008) (acknowledging theory of defacto deportation, rooted in understanding
that families should not be separated).
127 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979) (establishing children's constitutional
rights as distinct from those of adults).
128 See Payne-Barahona v. Gonzdles, 474 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding no right to family
unity, expressing fear of consequence of establishing right); see also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enf't Div. of the Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2007); cf sources
cited supra note 71 (finding right to family unity in non-immigration cases).
129 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't Div. of the Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510
F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding right to family unity only issue when permanent separation
threatened); see also Payne-Barahona v. Gonzdles, 474 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (detailing court's
concern about ramifications of broadly invoked right to family unity).
130 See Payne-Barahona v. Gonzdles, 474 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (detailing court's concern
about ramifications establishing broad right to family unity).
131 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
745, 651 (1982)) (noting parents' fundamental liberty interest in "companionship, care, custody,
and management" of children).
132 See cases cited supra note 74 (refusing to utilize higher standard when reviewing cases
focusing on family unity).
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the likelihood that a challenge based on the violation of this right is subject
to strict scrutiny.1 3 3
Given the courts' continual reliance on the benefits a child derives
from family unity in other legal contexts, an advocate would not be making
a significant stretch in arguing the historical roots of a child's right to an
intact family.13 4 Advocates would be wise, however, to strengthen their
arguments in a few ways.1 35 First, in order to bolster claims that minor
children's rights can be differentiated from that of their parents, advocates
should draw a positive comparison between the context of a parent's removal
and other contexts in which the courts have found a child has a right
independent of parents.1 36
In a critical decision, the Supreme Court held that a minor had an
independent right to obtain an abortion due to the uniquely "grave and
indelible" nature of the choice to reproduce."' It would be hard for the
government to argue that family separation is not "grave" in the face of the
courts' past reasoning surrounding the importance of family unity, but the
government has successfully argued in prior cases that any separation caused
by removal is temporary, which hardly qualifies as "indelible."l 38 Advocates
should therefore focus on the uniquely indelible nature of the results of
separation during critical developmental years, despite the potentially

See cases cited supranote 90 (highlighting possible differential treatment of rights between
citizens and non-citizens).
134 See source cited supra note 42 (detailing problems inherent to family separation in
international custody dispute); source cited supra note 81 (noting hardship inherent to any
separation of parent and children).
1' See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (reasoning children's vulnerability,
"importance of ... parental role in child rearing" mandate unique judicial approach to rights). In
certain specific instances, such as abortion, the child's liberty interest must override that ofa parent.
Id. at 642; cf cases cited supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (explaining why child's rights
violated under same set of facts where adult's rights not violated). See also sources cited supra
notes 8, 10 (reviewing issues children face when parents are deported); cases cited supra note 74
(refusing to analyze issues regarding family unit with higher standard).
136 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (exemplifying child's liberty interest
overriding that of parent); cf Perdido v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 420 F.2d 1179, 1181
(5th Cir. 1969) (explaining "minor children do not ordinarily determine where their own home will
be").
137 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1979) (distinguishing abortion rights from
other decisions).
138 Compare Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft Div. of the Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (reasoning any family separation caused by removal is
temporary), with case cited supra note 42 and accompanying text (detailing problems inherent to
family separation in international custody dispute), and sources cited supra note 81 (noting
hardship inherent to any separation of parent and children).
133
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temporary duration of separation itself, when arguing for a minor child's
independent right to family unity in the face of a parent's removal. 139
Additionally, any argument for the existence of a minor's
independent right to family unity would be bolstered by the proposition that
a minor may have a stronger claim to a right to family unity than does an
adult, even that child's own parent.' 40 This is partially because a parent's
right to family unity has historically been subordinated to the interests of the
state; emphasizing the relative strength of a child's right may therefore be
necessary to bolster chances of outweighing state interests. 14 1 More
importantly, the issue of family unity may be one in which a child may have
greater categorical protection under the Constitution due to minors' unique
vulnerability and level of maturity, and this greater categorical protection
may make strict scrutiny more likely. 142 Advocates could reasonably draw
parallels between a minor child's right to family unity in the face of parental
removal, and a child's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in
the face of life imprisonment or capital punishment. 143 In the cruel and
unusual punishment cases, the Supreme Court reasoned that it was both
appropriate and necessary to take into account a minor's unique
developmental attributes, holding that as a result of those unique attributes,
a punishment that would not violate an adult's rights would violate the rights
of a child. 1" Similarly, a minor's unique developmental state should be
considered in the context of violations of a right to family unity, as a minor
depends on her parents for physical, mental, and developmental health in a
way that an adult does not depend on a child, and any separation would
therefore have the potential to damage a child more severely. 145

139 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (reasoning children's vulnerability and
"importance of the parental role in child rearing" mandate unique judicial approach to rights); cf
sources cited supra notes 8, 11 (describing damage done to children of deported parents).
'40 See cases cited supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (explaining why child's rights
violated under same set of facts where adult's rights not violated); see also cases cited supra note
74 (refusing to review immigration law cases, focused on family unity, with higher standard).
141 See cases cited supra note 74 (refusing to review family unit issues under stricter standard).
142 See cases cited supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (clarifying why children's rights
differ from adult's rights).
143 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77-79 (2010) (reasoning vulnerability and maturity
differences between children and adults); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)
(quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion)) ("[T]he State is
entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
concern, . . . sympathy, and ... paternal attention."').
144 See sources cited supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (distinguishing cruelty can be
different between varying age groups).
145 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (noting unique justifications for rights of
parents and children differing); cf sources cited supra notes 8, 11 (describing challenges children
of deported parents face).
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Accordingly, any argument regarding a minor child's right to family unity
would be bolstered by emphasizing the intersection between that child's
healthy development and his ability to be reared by his parent(s).1 4 6
ii. A Minor's Qualified Right to Remain, With Consideration of
Best Interest
Even if an advocate is successful in persuading a court that a minor
has a fundamental right to family unity, she must also establish that the child
has a right to remain in the United States in order to frame the issue as one
of an impermissibly coerced choice between fundamental rights. 147 While
the right of an adult U.S. citizen to remain in the United States is firmly
established, the issue of whether a child has such a right, or is able to exercise
it, remains less certain.148 Therefore, an advocate aiming to successfully
argue that a minor whose parents face removal is forced to choose between
family unity, and a right to remain, will need to establish both that the minor
has an immediate right to remain in the United States, and that she is able to
independently exercise it. 149
To successfully make such an argument, an advocate would need to
emphasize that any such right is limited in its scope; court rulings in the
context of international custody battles indicate that if a child has a right to
remain, it is subordinate to both parental decisions and certain compelling
state interests.150 The removal context should be differentiated from an
international custody dispute in a critical way: A parent's freely-made
decision regarding the best interest of her child is at stake in an international
custody dispute, whereas any purported parental "decision" to raise a child
outside the United States is made under duress in the context of parental
removal."' This distinction is crucial; courts have consistently held that a
fit parent has the right to decide what is in his child's best interest, and have
146 See discussion supra Section 0.
147 See Osterberg, supra note 32, at 761 (describing decisions reasoning children's right to
remain is delayed until adulthood); see also cases cited supra note 61 (outlining court decisions
holding that children do not have power to choose residence).
148 Compare Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (establishing deportation of
citizen as violation of liberty interest), with cases cited supra note 61 (describing court decisions
that reason children are unable to exercise right to remain).
149 See sources cited supra note 62 (describing decisions reasoning children's right to remain
is delayed until adulthood); see also cases cited supra note 61 (describing decisions asserting
minors do not retain authority to choose domicile).
150 See cases cited supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (describing instances where U.S.
citizen children were ordered into custody of parents overseas).
151 40 and accompanying text (describing voluntary parental decisions). But see cases cited
supra note 61 (explaining parental decision regarding child's future residence in removal cases).
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subordinated certain rights of children to the decisions of their parents, but
only in the context where what is at stake is the parent's freely made
choice.152 Where the parent is not in a position to voluntarily choose what is
in her child's best interest, but instead is forced to make a decision under
duress, it is less plausible to reason (as some courts have done in the context
of parental removal) that a child cannot independently exercise a right to
remain because any right she has is subordinate to her parent's decisionmaking rights. 153 A successful advocate, therefore, should emphasize that
parents cannot freely choose what is in their children's best interest when
faced with removal, and therefore a minor in such circumstances may be able
to independently exercise a right to remain in that specific context. 1 54
Furthermore, a successful advocate may need to address an
argument that a child's right to remain is subordinate to the decision-making
of the state in the absence of a parent's ability to freely decide where the
child will reside.' Here, the best interest of the child standard should be
addressed.156 An advocate should rely on the fact that courts have been
reluctant to subordinate a child's fundamental rights to the interests of the
state, merely because of the child's status as a minor, except where the child
is unable to protect herself from harm, or where the state must otherwise act
in the child's best interest.' Even in cases involving international custody
disputes, where the state's interest in upholding international treaties have
been upheld, part of the rationale for upholding the treaties was their purpose
to protect vulnerable children from kidnapping and other harm.ss In the case
of a parent's removal proceeding, where the government's interests are not
related to promoting the child's best interest, it is therefore not appropriate
to expect the child to subordinate her right to remain to the power of the
state.159
152 See sources cited supra notes 30-32 (outlining courts' deference to parental rights).
153 40 (describing nature of parental decisions). But see cases cited supranote 61 (discussing
child's residence in removal cases is parental determination).
154 40 (describing parental decisions and consequential risks of abduction if ignored). But see
cases cited supra note 61 (explaining parent decision governs).
'5s See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (explaining state's role in promoting child's
wellbeing when parent falters).
156 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-38 (1968) (justifying infringement of
juvenile's right based on state's interest in protecting child).
1" See cases cited supra notes 34-37 (describing state interests outweighing child's liberty
interests only in limited circumstances).
18 See cases cited supranote 41 (highlighting state's interest in promoting welfare of children,
in face of possible abduction by parent).
1" See Cabrera-Alvarez v. GonzAles, 423 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[N]o rule of
statutory construction required the agency to elevate the qualifying child's best interests to a level
that would effectively eliminate or alter the express comparative standard set forth in the statutory
text.").
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Because there is significant precedent of courts rejecting the
argument that a child has an independent right to remain in the United States
that is jeopardized in removal proceedings, it is possible that even in
emphasizing the involuntary nature of any parental decision, and the
inappropriateness of the state making a decision for the child in a removal
context, an advocate may not find success.' It would therefore help to
argue that at the very least, the state's decision regarding the child's effective
right to remain should take her best interests into consideration.1 6' The
courts have regularly held that the state is not required to choose to act in a
child's best interest, but implicit in many decisions is that, as a matter of due
process, the state should at least consider the child's best interest as a
factor.1 6 2 Accordingly, an advocate might find success arguing that a minor
facing constructive deportation has a right to have her best interests weighed
as a factor, if the state is to avoid violating her narrow right to remain.' 63 The
result would be that the government would need to consider a child's best
interest in making parental removal decisions, and an advocate could
compellingly argue that it is in a child's best interest to remain with her
family, in her community, in the United States." Alternatively, if the
government failed to consider the child's best interest, it would violate the
child's independent right to remain, and an advocate could once again put
forth the argument that the child was impermissibly forced to choose
between two fundamental rights.1 65
C. Existence of More Narrowly-TailoredAlternatives to Immediate
Removal
An advocate who is successful in arguing that a minor U.S. citizen's
fundamental rights are at stake in his parent(s) removal proceedings will still
160 See sources cited supra notes 61-63 (explaining reasoning in rejecting U.S. citizen
children's claims).
161 See cases cited supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting state may consider best
interest as factor in determining extreme hardship); see also case cited supra notes 86-88 and
accompanying text (holding in cases regarding juvenile pre-removal detention no requirement for
child's best interest to prevail).
162 See cases cited supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting state considers weighs
factors in extreme hardship analysis); see also cases cited supra notes 86-88 and accompanying
text (holding child's best interest need not be determinative factor).
163 See cases cited supranotes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that child's
best interests may be considered as one factor).
1" See sources cited supra note 22 (discussing challenges removal causes for children); see
also case cited supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing harms child faces losing parents
and community).
165 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (explaining principle prohibiting
government from forcing people to choose between fundamental rights).
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need to show that the parent's removal during the child's age of minority, in
violation of that child's fundamental rights, is not a sufficiently narrowlytailored way of achieving the government's admittedly compelling interest
in enforcing immigration laws.166 An advocate might find success in using
the proposed DAPA program as an example of the existence of alternatives
to immediate removal. 16 7 The program included very limited provisions,
allowing for a non-citizen to lawfully reside and work in the United States
for a specific period of time, but not conferring benefits such as the ability
to sponsor another individual, the right to gain a direct path to citizenship, or
the right to receive government benefits. 168
Because of these restrictions, the temporary nature of the program,
and the necessity for renewal and government oversight, programs like
DAPA do not ultimately impede the state's ability to choose who to exclude;
those participating aren't truly enjoying the full benefits of immigration, and
the government has the right and ability to remove participants at the
program's termination date.16 9 But such programs do provide an alternative
to immediate removal, allowing participants to remain in the United States
for a time.170 In the context of parental removal, an advocate could
convincingly argue that some sort of deferred action program might be
offered to those in removal proceedings who are parents of a minor U.S.
citizen, lasting until the child reaches the age of majority, and that such a
program would promote the government's interest in enforcing immigration
laws while upholding the citizen child's fundamental rights."' The
government might reasonably argue that, given their potential for lengthy
delay in ultimate enforcement of immigration laws, such programs are not
the ideal way to advance the government's goals. 17 2 But under strict scrutiny,
the government must use the most narrowly-tailored means available to
advance its goals where fundamental rights are at stake, not the ideal means
from a policy perspective; therefore the mere existence of alternatives such

166 See cases cited supra note 55 (outlining fundamental rights involves strict scrutiny
standard).
167 See sources cited supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (describing DAPA program).
168 See sources cited supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (acknowledging limited
benefits of DAPA program).
169 See sources cited supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (reviewing DAPA program's
scope).
170 See sources cited supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (describing process for
remaining in U.S. under DAPA).
171 See sources cited supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (outlining compromise
program offering some temporary benefits).
172 See sources cited supra note 19 (explaining administration's view that delays in removal
constitute "amnesty").
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as DAPA should be sufficient to establish that removal is not a permissible
173
means of achieving the state's goals in this context.
VII. CONCLUSION
Advocates who have attempted to prevent the deportation of parents
of minor U.S. citizens have not yet found much success in the courts.
However, as the scale of the problem grows, and remedies proposed by other
branches of government fail to materialize, the time may be ripe for new
attempts at, and approaches to, a judicial remedy. To increase chances of
success in court, advocates should focus on the rights of minor U.S. citizens
rather than those of their parents, in the hope of avoiding the lax scrutiny
afforded under the plenary powers doctrine. Furthermore, advocates may
meet with more success if they position the issue as one of an
unconstitutional choice between two fundamental rights: a qualified right for
the citizen child to remain in the United States, incorporating consideration
of the child's best interests, and the unique right of a minor to family unity.
Finally, to reduce the strength of the government's argument that immediate
deportation of parents is the only way to enforce immigration laws, and to
reduce worry that judicial acknowledgement of the citizen child's rights
would create incentives for undocumented immigrants to give birth in the
United States, advocates should lean on the example of DAPA as evidence
of the existence and feasibility of more narrowly-tailored alternatives.
Julie Martin

173 See cases cited supra note 55 and accompanying text (outlining strict scrutiny standard for
fundamental rights).

